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Abstract
In the summer of 2010, Taiwanese-based Foxconn
Technology Group-the world's largest electronics
manufacturer-utilized  the  labor  of  150,000
student  interns  from  vocational  schools  at  its
facilities all over China. Foxconn is one of many
global  firms utilizing student  intern  labor.  Far
from being freely chosen, student internships are
organized  by  the  local  state  working  with
enterprises and schools, frequently in violation of
the rights of student interns and in violation of
Chinese law. Foxconn, through direct deals with
government  departments,  has  outsourced
recruitment to vocational schools to obtain a new
source  of  student  workers  at  below minimum
wages. The goals and timing of internships are
set  not  by  student  educational  or  training
priorities  but  by  the  demand  for  products
dictated  by  companies.  Based  on  fieldwork  in
Sichuan and Guangdong between 2011 and 2012
and  follow-up  interviews  in  2014,  as  well  as
analysis of the Henan government's policies on
internships, we find that the student labor regime
has  become  integral  to  the  capital-state
relationship as a means to assure a lower cost
and flexible labor supply for Foxconn and others.
This is  one dimension of the emerging face of
Chinese state capitalism.
Keywords
student  labor,  state  capitalism,  internship,
vocational  school,  Foxconn  Technology  Group
I. Introduction
"My original plan was to seek an internship at
Huawei Technologies, but our teacher persuaded
my  whole  class  of  42  students  to  intern  at
Foxconn Technology Group,"  a student from a
vocational  school  in  Sichuan's  Mianyang  city
recalled.  Under  pressure  from  the  Sichuan
government  to  fulfill  a  quota  for  interns  at
Foxconn  in  2010,  the  teacher  was  directed  to
recruit  entire  classes  and  overcome  student
objections to taking Foxconn internships. "During
the  night  shift,  whenever  I  look  out  in  that
direction  [pointing  to  the  west],  I  see  the  big
fluorescent  sign of  Huawei  shining bright  red,
and at that moment, I feel a pain in my heart,"
she  said  before  sinking  into  a  long  silence.
Huawei (founded in Shenzhen as a private-sector
firm in 1987) and Foxconn (founded in Taipei in
1974  and  incorporated  in  Shenzhen  as  a
Taiwanese-invested  enterprise  in  1988)  have
headquarters on opposite sides of the Meiguan
Expressway in Longhua Town, Shenzhen City.
Although neither  the intern nor we can verify
whether  the  internship  program  offered  by
Huawei would have been any better than that at
Foxconn, she regretted her inability to choose her
internship  site  (Fieldwork  in  Shenzhen  City,
Guangdong Province, April 2011).
Who are the interns? How are they recruited and
managed  at  the  workplace?  In  this  article  we
show  the  processes  by  which  companies,
vocational schools, and local governments jointly
carry out "internship programs" that turn large
numbers  of  teenage  students  into  factory
workers. We attempt to explain the emergence of
this  student  labor  regime  in  the  context  of
China's  rising  manufacturing  costs  and
intensified  competition  among  companies  for
employees in global production. Analyzing the
organization of student internships, we look into
the pivotal role of transnational capital and its
ability  to  secure  privileged  access  to  labor  in
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negotiation  with  the  Chinese  state.  The  active
cooperation  of  provincial  and  lower  level
governments  in  circumventing  labor  law
restrictions,  and ensuring corporate access to a
lower cost and flexible supply of student labor
(xueshenggong  學生工),  is  fundamental  to  the
contemporary Chinese labor regime.
Our  primary  research  is  based  on  multiple
fieldtrips to Foxconn's largest assembly facilities
in  Sichuan  (Chengdu  City)  and  Guangdong
(Shenzhen  City)  between  2011  and  2012,  and
follow-up  visits  in  Shenzhen  in  August  2014,
supplemented  with  inquiries  made  to  senior
company executives between December 2013 and
April  2014.1  Drawing  on  interviews  with  38
interns  and 14  teachers,  who were  dispatched
from eight vocational schools (based in Sichuan
and Henan provinces)  to Foxconn factories for
internships,  we  also  conducted  documentary
analysis  of  the  Henan  government's  major
policies on student internships and employment.
There  has  been  scant  scholarly  attention  to
student interns as temporary or contingent labor,
leaving unexamined an important dimension of
the precarity of Chinese labor that is the product
of the triangular relationship linking capital, the
local state, and vocational schools in internship
programs.  In  the  following  we  review  the
changing labor market and ongoing legal reforms
and structural transformation in China. We then
present the findings of our study of the Foxconn
internship program, and conclude by assessing
the  corporate  and  government  responses  to
student labor abuses.
The majority of Foxconn's more than one million workers are rural migrants and teenage student
interns. Fushikang, headquartered in Taipei (registered as Hon Hai Precision Industry Company),
literally means "wealthy" and "healthy" in Chinese. Photographs taken during field trips to
Guangdong and Sichuan (2011-2014).
 
II. Student Labor in China
The re-emergence of labor markets under China's
reforms since the late 1970s has transformed the
economy in step with Chinese and international
investment  and  the  privatization  of  numerous
state  enterpr ises .  Employment  in  the
manufacturing sector (relative to agriculture and
the service industry) reached an unprecedented
15 percent of the economically active population
in  the  mid-1990s.  The  percentage  would  have
been even higher if the other eight to 14 percent
of  those  employed in  uncategorized industries
were added (Evans and Staveteig 2009, 78). The
increase in industrial workers was mainly drawn
from the hundreds of millions of rural migrants
who,  in  the  wake  of  de-collectivization,  were
absorbed  into  booming  township  and  village
enterprises and export-oriented privately-owned
factories,  along  with  state  and  collective
enterprises.  However,  the  labor  rights  and
interests  of  many  internal  migrants  were
unprotected. It was not until July 1994, following
tragic industrial fires and deaths and numerous
abuses,  that  the  government  promulgated  a
Labor  Law  to  regulate  the  complex  labor
relations of the market economy (Gallagher 2005,
2014;  Ngok  2008;  Liebman  2014).  The  law
guarantees  basic  protections  to  all  worker-
citizens,  regardless  of  household  registration
status or ownership type, such as entitlement to
employment  contracts,  local  minimum  wages,
overtime  premiums,  social  insurance  and
retirement benefits,  rest  days,  safe and healthy
workplaces, and access to government-sponsored
labor dispute resolution mechanisms. Despite the
national  labor  compliance  requirements,
employers systematically "ignored the law with
impunity  because  of  the  lack  of  effective
implementation  and  enforcement  by  local
regulatory  or  supervisory  organizations,
including the trade union, the local labor bureau
and the courts" (Gallagher and Dong 2011, 44).
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When  structural  reforms  and  privatization
accelerated in the 1990s and following China's
accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization  in
2001,  many  small  and  medium  state-owned
enterprises lost out in the fierce new competition.
Laid-off  workers,  especially  those  who  were
relatively young, joined the rank and file of rural
migrants  to  toil  in  the  "world  factory,"  facing
great uncertainties in a more liberalized economy
(Solinger 2009; Blecher 2010; Andreas 2012; Hurst
2009, 2015). As of 2005, Chinese manufacturing
wages as a percentage of US wages, compared to
those of Japan and East Asian Tigers like South
Korea  and  Taiwan  in  the  early  years  of  their
economic  takeoffs,  had  remained  consistently
low  (Hung  2008,  fig.  1,  2009,  fig.  5).  Private
companies  as  well  as  restructured  state
enterprises  have  generally  offered  fixed-term
employment  contracts,  effectively  ending  a
lifetime  "iron  rice  bowl"  tenure  that  had been
prevalent in large urban state enterprises. Other
employing  units,  however,  failed  to  provide
labor  contracts,  minimum statutory  wages,  or
welfare  benefits,  generating  worker  grievances
and resistance (Chan 2001; Pringle 2011; Elfstrom
and Kuruvilla 2014; Zipp and Blecher 2015). In
the  face  of  increasing  worker  lawsuits  and
collective  protests  since  the  mid-1990s,  the
Chinese government was compelled to expand
legal  reforms  to  ensure  minimally  acceptable
social and labor standards as a means to alleviate
the  growing  tensions  between  legitimacy  and
profitability (Lee 2007; Lee and Zhang 2013; Chen
2012; Friedman 2014).2
From  the  mid-2000s,  as  a  result  of  growing
worker demands for better conditions, tightening
labor markets due to demographic changes, and
Beijing  government  measures  to  stimulate
domestic consumption such as boosting statutory
minimum  wages  and  abolishing  agricultural
taxes, wages have been rising (Chu and So 2010;
Eggleston et  al.  2013;  Davis  2014;  Whyte 2014;
Naughton  2014).  Firms  were  increasingly
pressured  to  cut  costs  and  to  cope  with
fluctuations  in  production  orders  by  hiring
temporary  workers,  including  student  interns
(also termed student apprentices or trainees) and
agency  laborers  (also  known  as  dispatched
workers,  who  signed  contracts  directly  with
privately-run  or  government-operated  agencies
but providing services to client  companies).  In
the  seven  large  state-owned  and  Sino-foreign
joint-ventured automobile assembly factories that
she surveyed,  Lu Zhang (2015)  found that  the
number of temporary workers ranged from one-
to  two-thirds  of  the  total  workforce  during
fieldwork  in  the  mid-to-late  2000s.  Downward
cost  pressure  in  business  competition,
particularly  during  the  2008  global  financial
crisis, eroded the wages and benefits as well as
job security of regular workers who have not yet
been  displaced  by  temporary  laborers.  The
latter's per capita cost averages only one-fourth
to one-third of the former's (Park and Cai 2011,
33-35; Zhou 2013, 362-63). Unequal treatment of
the temporary and regular workers performing
identical  production tasks  created a  two-tiered
employment  system.  This  system  engendered
worker  conflicts  and  social  divisions.  As  Eli
Friedman  and  Ching  Kwan  Lee  (2010,  513)
insightfully  observe,  this  dual  labor regime "is
problematic not just from the perspective of the
informal  workers,  but  also  from  [that  of]  the
regular  workers,  who  will  find  it  increasingly
difficult  to  make  collective  demands  on  their
employers."
Agency workers, who were long excluded from
nat ional  legal  protect ion  pr ior  to  the
implementation of the significant Labor Contract
Law on 1 January 2008, eventually gained access
to basic employment rights, if only honored on
the  books.  Under  the  new  law,  under  which
hiring agencies and client firms share joint legal
responsibilities, agency workers are supposed to
receive the same pay for doing the same work as
directly employed workers. Moreover, they are
assumed to take only "temporary, auxiliary, and
substitute"  posts,  thereby placing certain limits
on informalization while maintaining labor and
organizational flexibility (Chan 2009; Harper Ho
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2009; Wang et al. 2009; Cui et al. 2013; Gallagher
et al. 2015; Zhang 2015, chap. 7). It is important to
note, however, that the 2008 law did not cover
interning students. Interns, who are not, after all
classified  as  workers,  can  be  laid  off  without
severance pay and 30 days' prior notice to which
employees are entitled. They continue to possess
fewer legal rights than agency or regular workers
even  when  they  are  directly  recruited  and
assigned to the same tasks (Pun and Chan 2012,
2013;  Chan  and  Selden  2014;  Pun  et  al.  2014;
Chan et al. 2013, 2015).
The vulnerability of interns as laborers, including
both those who are unpaid and those who are
under-paid,  has  recently  drawn  discussion
centering on the applicability of relevant national
and  international  laws.  Earl  Brown  and  Kyle
deCant  (2014),  in  their  provocative  essay
"Exploiting  Chinese  Interns  as  Unprotected
Industrial  Labor,"  ask whether interns-who are
not legally defined as employees under Chinese
law-are in practice provided equal labor rights at
work,  and  whether  the  internship  experience
benefits  the intern.  The controversy is  not  just
about poor management and lack of educational
content  in  some  internship  programs,  as
documented in the 2010 OECD (Organization for
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development)
review  report  on  China's  development  of
vocational  education  and  workplace-based
internship  training  (Kuczera  and  Field  2010,
18-27).  It  is  ultimately about the well-being of,
and  fundamental  fairness  to,  student  intern
workers.  While the Chinese state has not fully
recognized  interns  as  workers,  it  has  granted
them  certain  rights  under  the  domestic  legal
framework.  Brown  and  deCant  (2014,  195)
compellingly  assert:  "When these  programs [at
Foxconn,  Honda,  and  other  workplaces]  are
devoid of  any relevant  educational  component
and  maintained  solely  for  the  benefit  of  the
employer's bottom line, these interns should be
afforded  the  full  protection  of  China's  labor
laws." We aim to extend the legalistic debates by
evaluating the role of the local state as a direct
agent  in  a  capitalist  development  process  in
which student labor governance is becoming an
integral and substantive part. As we will see, at
stake is  not  a  mere legal  technicality;  it  is  the
dynamism of a capital-state alliance that charts
the  role  of  student  labor  with  important
implications both for student (mis)education and
the corporate bottom line.
From  the  national  to  the  global  level,  the
promulgat ion  of  a  set  of  non-binding
transnational labor and environmental standards
has been among the key corporate responses to
sweatshop charges made by workers and their
supporters in many countries (Ross 2004; Smith
et al. 2006; Litzinger 2013; Locke 2013; Lüthje et
al.  2013;  Ruggie  2013).  Workers-including
student interns-are subjected to the pressure of
buyers  in  multi-layered  production  networks.
Image-conscious  companies,  in  response  to
charges of labor abuse in factories that produce
their products,  pledge to adhere to good labor
practices in global production, such as respecting
the  rights  of  "student  workers"  in  China
(Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition [EICC]
2014,  44).  Electronic  Industry  Citizenship
Coalition  (EICC),  the  membership-based
industry  association  representing  Apple  and
Foxconn  and  100-plus  other  companies
worldwide,  has  asserted  that,  "In  the  past  10
years  we  have  seen  that  consistent  auditing,
clearer  guidelines,  greater  transparency  and  a
Code of  Conduct  can play important  roles"  in
regulating "student working hours, wages, [and]
health and safety gaps" (EICC 2015, 4). In China's
high-tech electronics manufacturing, researchers
including ourselves have just begun to assess the
impact of corporate codes of conduct on workers'
conditions.
In a nutshell, we locate student labor at the heart
of  key  industries,  notably  electronics,  in
globalized China. In contrast to the approach of
Lu Zhang in Inside China's Automobile Factories
(2015,  chaps.  5-6),  who  did  not  distinguish
between interning students and agency workers
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in her categorization of "temporary workers," a
group contrasted to "formal workers," we aim to
understand the distinctive character  of  student
interns  in  China's  international  political
economy. Accordingly,  we examine the central
role  of  three  parties  in  the  recruitment  and
control of students during the internship period,
namely, factory managers,  school teachers,  and
local officials.  Our major goal is to explain the
systemic  deployment  of  student  interns  in
industrial  production  through  a  study  of
Foxconn's  practice,  thereby  contributing  to
deeper  understanding  of  the  massive  use  of
student interns on worker fragmentation among
Chinese workers.
III. The Foxconn Internship Program
With more than one million employees, Foxconn
is  the  world's  largest  industrial  employer
(DeCarlo  2014)  and  probably  maintains  the
world's largest internship program. The Foxconn
internship program, which brought in as many as
150,000  young  students  during  the  peak
product ion  months  in  summer  2010 -
approximately  15  percent  of  the  company's
workforce  (Foxconn Technology Group 2010a)-
and which continues to hire new interns across
China  at  present,  dwarfs  Disney's  College
Program,  which  received  more  than  50,000
interns cumulatively over 30 years from college
partners in the United States and abroad (Perlin
2011, 6). How is the capital-state-school coalition
behind  the  Foxconn  internship  program
organized?
Foxconn is a key node in the Asian and global
production  networks,  where  the  processing  of
components,  final  assembly,  and  shipment  of
finished products to world consumers continues
around the clock 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
Inside  Foxconn  there  are  more  than  a  dozen
"business  groups"  (shiyequn  事業群),  which
compete  on  speed,  quality,  eff iciency,
engineering  services,  and  added  value  to
maximize  profits.  In  one  of  these  business
groups,  iDPBG  (integrated  Digital  Product
Business Group), which produces exclusively for
Apple, 28,044 student interns worked alongside
workers in Shenzhen in 2010-a six-fold increase
from 4,539  in  2007.  They  were  recruited  from
"more  than  200  secondary  vocational  schools"
(Foxconn Technology Group 2010b, 23).  At the
company's  30-plus  manufacturing  mega-
complexes across China (see Figure 1), workers
and student interns toil day and night to churn
out iPhones, iPads, and other electronic products
for Apple and other IT corporations. Following
Chinese  government  stimulus-led  growth  and
economic  recovery,  as  well  as  large-volume
orders, in 2010, Foxconn registered a 53 percent
year-on-year  increase  in  revenues  to  US$95
billion  (3  trillion  NTD)  (Foxconn  Technology
Group  2011,  4).  Student  interns,  among
assembly-line workers, played an indispensable
role in corporate expansion.
Foxconn locations in greater China, 1974-2015. Foxconn has more than 30 factories
across China. In many cities, Foxconn runs multiple manufacturing facilities. Sources:
Foxconn Technology Group company websites and annual reports.
 
China has more than 13,300 registered vocational
schools  and  colleges  (Xinhua  2015).  In  2014,
approximately 18 million full-time students were
enrolled in secondary vocational schools across
the country. The government projects an increase
in vocational school enrollment to 23.5 million by
2020 (not including those in vocational colleges
or  adult  vocational  education)  (Ministry  of
Education  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China
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2010a, table 1).  Upon completing nine years of
compulsory education, students can compete to
continue  their  studies  in  general  track  high
schools or enroll in vocational institutions. The
age  of  admission  to  standard  three-year
vocational schools is often as young as 15. While
students  in  high  schools  are  prepared  for
university entrance, those in vocational schools
are trained for skilled work or higher vocational
education.
Vocational  schools  offer  employment-oriented
courses  for  first-  and  second-year  students.
During their third year, when they are 17 to 18
years  old,  students  are  expected  to  intern  at
enterprises  that  are  "directly  relevant  to  their
studies" (Ministries of Education and Finance of
the  People's  Republic  of  China  2007,  art.  3).
However, our interviews revealed that Foxconn
not only recruits students regardless of their field
of  study,  but  also  often  much  earlier  than  is
legally allowed (that is, in their first and second
years of vocational studies). In our sample, only
eight of the 38 student interns were in their final
year. Their average age was 16.5, just above the
national statutory minimum working age of 16.
The Working Conditions of Student Interns
The duration of the Foxconn internship programs
we studied during fieldwork in 2011 and 2012
ranged from three months to one year. From the
beginning of her internship, Liu Siying3, the final-
year student aspiring to a meaningful learning
opportunity whom we met at the opening of this
article,  was  "tied  to  the  PCB  [printed  circuit
board] line attaching components to the product
back-casing." In her words, "it required no skills
or prior knowledge." Students were assigned to a
one-size-fits-all  internship at  Foxconn factories,
which involved repetitive manual labor divorced
from their studies and interests.
Foxconn Chengdu's newly built 18-story
factory dormitory, Block 2. Teachers are
housed in dorm rooms next to their
students to strengthen control during the
off-work hours throughout the
"internship."
Sichuan Zhongjiang Vocational School
students, many of them 16 years of age,
arrived at Foxconn (Chengdu) in the
morning on 3 March 2011 to begin
"internships."
 
China's leaders seek to boost labor productivity
through expanded investment in vocational skill
training (Woronov 2011;  Hansen and Woronov
2013; Ling 2015). At Foxconn, interns were placed
on assembly lines to work illegally long shifts of
ten to 12 hours, six to seven days a week. Article
5  of  the  2007  Administrative  Measures  for
Internships  at  Secondary  Vocational  Schools
(Ministries  of  Education  and  Finance  of  the
People's  Republic  of  China  2007)  states  that
"interns shall not work more than eight hours a
day," and the 2010 Education Circular (Clause 4)
specifies  that  "interns  shall  not  work overtime
beyond  the  eight-hour  workday"  (Ministry  of
Education  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China
2010b). Not only must interns' shifts be no more
than  eight  hours,  all  their  training  activity  is
required to take place during daytime to ensure
students' safety and physical and mental health,
in line with the Law of the People's Republic of
China  on  the  Protection  of  Minors  (2013).4  In
reality, interns ranging in age from 16 to 18 were
subjected  to  the  same  working  conditions  as
regular workers,  including alternating day and
night shifts and extensive overtime, defying the
letter and the spirit of the education law.
A typical  comment  by interns,  their  hopes for
gaining technical knowledge dashed, underlines
the harsh reality of life on the line: "We're sent to
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do trivial  tasks like checking iPad screens and
cleaning the product surface ... we're frustrated at
repeating  the  same  boring  work  all  day"
(Interviews  on  19  March  2011;  18  December
2011). Foxconn Global Social and Environmental
Responsibility  Committee  Executive  Director,
Martin  Hsing,  has  defended  the  internship
program,  saying  that  "it  meets  the  needs  and
expectations  of  the  interns,"  even  when  the
educational  value  of  internship  is  reduced  to
assembly-line  labor,  pure  and  simple.  He
emphasized  that  school  participation  is
"voluntary" and that interns are "free to terminate
their internship at any time;" more importantly,
the company has "specific policies to ensure that
[the internship program] is implemented in full
accordance with China law" and its "own Code of
Conduct"  (Foxconn  Technology  Group  2013).
Several students told us that they phoned their
parents  after  the  first  week  of  the  internship
asking them to  pressure  Foxconn managers  to
immediately  "release  the  interns."  They  failed.
They were told that they "risked not being able to
graduate" if they refused internships at Foxconn
(Interviews on 3 March 2011;  1  April  2011;  20
January 2012).
At  Foxconn,  student  interns  are  paid.  As  of
January 2011,  while student interns and entry-
level workers had the same starting wage of 950
yuan/month  (USD  $154  /  GBP  £100  /  EUR
€128), only employees could receive a skill bonus
of 400 yuan/month (USD $65 / GBP £43 / EUR
€54). Interns were not entitled to have their skills
assessed in order to qualify for the bonus (see
Figure  2).  China's  Vocational  Education  Law,
effective 1 September 1996, states that students
participating in  vocational  education programs
"shall be paid properly for their work" (Article
37, shidang de laodong baochou 適當的勞動報酬)
(Ministry of Education of the People's Republic
o f  Ch ina  1 996 ) .  S im i l a r l y ,  t h e  2 007
Administrative  Measures  for  Internships  at
Secondary  Vocational  Schools  stipulate  that
employers should "pay reasonably for the labor
of interns" (Article 8, heli de shixi baochou 合理
的實習報酬). Maintaining that student interns are
not  employees-even  when  they  perform  work
identical to that of production workers-Foxconn
does  not  enroll  interns  in  government-
administered  social  security,  which  covers
medical  insurance,  work  injury  insurance,
unemployment  benefits,  maternity  insurance,
and old age pensions, nor in a housing provident
fund (known collectively as "wu xian yi jin" 五險
一金). By dispensing with all of these benefits, the
company saves money.
For  the  period  of  our  investigation,  Foxconn
claimed to  have provided "work-related injury
and health insurance" for all interns (quoted in
Fair  Labor  Association  2012,  10),  but  our
interviewed interns  said  they  had received no
information about an insurance policy. A quick
look at the math reveals that, in 2015, assuming a
total  of  150,000  student  interns  working  in
various Foxconn factories during one month in
the peak season, the savings from not providing
them with  welfare  benefits  is  roughly  150,000
persons × 300 yuan = 45,000,000 yuan (economic
conditions and statutory minimum wages vary
substantially across China; we use the lower end
of  300  yuan/month  per  person  for  this
illustration5). While this is a simplified exercise, it
conveys a good sense of  employer savings for
just  one month;  considering that  many interns
work for a full year, the annual savings must be
far greater.
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Foxconn (Chengdu) job ad, 2011. The
advertisement makes clear the
company's savings in employing
student interns who are ineligible for
the 400 yuan per month wage hike
after three months. It does not
disclose other savings such as
payments toward pensions. Source:
Foxconn Technology Group.
Cost cutting is especially imperative in electronic
manufacturing  where  profit  margins  are  thin
(Kraemer et al. 2011; Lüthje et al. 2013). In recent
years,  state  minimum  wages  have  steadily
increased and companies have faced pressure to
raise  wages  to  retain  workers,  particularly  a
young cohort, who frequently changed jobs in an
attempt to get better pay and benefits. National
Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of
China (2014,  fig.  1)  reported that average total
income  of  rural  migrant  workers  had  risen
steadily following the economic recovery in 2009,
reaching  unprecedented  2,609  yuan/month  in
2013, a 13.9 percent increase from the previous
year. However, "speed, not just cost," might be
"the killer attribute" that gives Foxconn and other
large manufacturers "the winning edge to remain
competitive" (Dinges 2012). Pressure from brand-
name  buyers  to  stay  responsive  to  consumer
demand  is  strong  (Hamilton  et  al.  2011).
Accordingly,  Foxconn  translates  production
requirements  for  fast  time-to-market  and  high
quality into increased work pressure and longer
hours.  In  a  rare  reference  to  the  production
pressures that Apple and its competitors apply,
Foxconn  CEO's  Special  Assistant  Louis  Woo
explained his company's perspective on overtime
in  an  April  2012  American  media  program
(Marketplace 2012):
The  overtime  problem-when  a
company like Apple or Dell needs to
ramp up production by 20 percent
for a new product launch, Foxconn
has two choices: hire more workers
or  give  the  workers  you  already
have more hours. When demand is
very  high,  it's  very  difficult  to
suddenly  hire  20  percent  more
people. Especially when you have a
million  workers-that  would  mean
hiring 200,000 people at once.
Woo's statement indicates that, when faced with
soaring  demand  from  Apple,  Dell,  and  other
electronics brands, Foxconn's first response is to
impose compulsory overtime on its existing labor
force. However, it also tries to hire more people
to respond seamlessly to corporate demands for
rush  orders.  Recruitment  through  vocational
schools  is  an  efficient  way to  pick  up tens  of
thousands  of  new  workers  at  once,  who  are
purportedly hired in the name of skills training
and school-business cooperation (xiaoqi hezuo 校
企合作).
In Shenzhen's Longhua Cultural Square, student
intern Zhang Lintong, 16, talked about school life
and music. He told us he admires the 19th century
Russian realist artist Ilya Repin and praised The
Song of the Volga Boatmen, which reminds him
of Repin's seminal painting Barge Haulers on the
Volga.6 Barge Haulers depicts a foreman and ten
laboring  men  hauling  an  enormous  barge
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upstream on the Volga.  The men seem on the
verge  of  collapse  from  exhaustion.  The  lead
hauler's  eyes  are  fixed  on  the  horizon.  The
second man bows his head into his chest and the
last  one  drifts  off  from the  line,  a  dead  man
walking. The haulers, dressed in rags, are tightly
bound with leather straps. The exception is the
brightly clad youth in the center of the group,
who raises  his  head while  fighting against  his
leather bonds in an effort to free himself  from
toil. "I often dream, but repeatedly tear apart my
dreams; like a miserable painter, tearing up my
draft sketches…I'm not interested in assembling
iPhone parts. It's exhausting and boring. I want
to quit. But I can't," Lintong sighed (Interview on
29 November 2011).
All 14 female and male teachers we interviewed
were aware that the Foxconn program violated
the purpose of internships, which are mandated
to provide an integral part of students' education
and skills training. Fearing punishment from the
school,  however,  teachers  and students  played
their parts in the charade called internship. The
teachers  reported  for  duty  at  the  company
administrative building from 9 a.m.  to  5  p.m.,
Monday  to  Friday.  They  were  housed  in  the
factory  dormitories  throughout  the  internship.
Only  one  teacher  expressed  criticisms  of  the
internship system in the course of our fieldwork.
Mr. Tian, a Sichuanese in his 40s, was a Chinese
literature teacher with more than two decades of
teaching experience.  "My daughter  is  17  years
old, my only daughter. She's now preparing for
the  national  college  entrance  exam.  No matter
what the result is, I won't let her come to intern,
or work, for this company." And yet he told us
that "paid internships at Foxconn were one of the
main  attractions  for  students  attending  his
school."  He  also  admitted,  however,  that  "at
Foxconn,  there's  no  real  learning  through
integration  of  classroom  and  workshop.  The
distortion  of  vocational  education  in  today's
China  is  deeply  rooted"  (Interview  on  16
December  2011).
Student  Internship  Recruitment  through
Government  and  School  Mobilization
50-seater public buses line up for Foxconn (Chengdu) in Pi
County, Sichuan. Drivers provide transportation service to
Foxconn at government discounted rates.
Government-printed banners on the sides of the buses read,
"Use fighting spirit to overcome earthquakes and natural
disasters to provide transportation for Foxconn."
Foxconn,  given  its  powerful  market  position,
gains access to numerous resources with strong
government support all over China. In the years
since the magnitude 7.9 earthquake that struck
Sichuan in May 2008, killing 87,150 people and
leaving  4,800,000  homeless,  the  provincial
government  has  redoubled  efforts  to  attract
investments  to  fund  reconstruction.  Zhuang
Hongren,  Foxconn's  chief  investment  officer,
pledged  to  "help  Chengdu  to  become  an
unshakeable city" in world electronics (quoted in
Sichuan Provincial  People's  Government  2011).
In  response,  local  off icials  subsidized
transportation services and provided numerous
benefits  for  the  company.  Foxconn  employees
now commute to work in public buses that have
been dedicated to the exclusive use of Foxconn
(Fieldwork in Pi County, Chengdu City, March
2011). Government-printed banners on the sides
of  the  buses  read,  "Use  fighting  spirit  against
earthquakes  and  natural  disasters  to  provide
transportation  for  Foxconn"  (yong  kangzhen
jiuzai  de  jingshen,  nuli  wancheng  Fushikang
baoche  yewu  用抗震救災的精神，努力完成富士
康包車業務).  Foxconn's  economic  influence  has
become so great that CEO Terry Gou is widely
known  among  workers  as  the  "Mayor  of
'Foxconn City'" in Chengdu, provincial capital of
Sichuan, southwest China.
Manager  Zhu,  a  31-year-old  college  graduate,
joined  the  human  resources  department  of
Foxconn Chengdu on its opening in October 2010
after seven years in a small state-owned factory,
was  chiefly  responsible  for  liaison  linking
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government,  vocational  schools,  and  Foxconn.
He explained (Interview on 14 December 2011):
Over the past year, I held monthly
meetings  with  government  leaders
responsible  for  the  "Number  One
Project" [yihao gongcheng 一號工程]
tailored  for  Foxconn.  Over  a  few
drinks  and  shared  cigarettes,  our
colleagues  and  local  government
officials  regularly  updated  each
other on the company's recruitment
schedules,  thereby  establishing  a
good  working  relationship.
The  Sichuan provincial  government  prioritized
helping Foxconn as its "Number One Project." It
offered Foxconn partial funding to construct its
gigantic  production  complex  and  18-story
dormitories.  In  addition  to  the  construction
projects, it undertook large-scale recruitment of
student  interns  and  workers  at  new  Foxconn
factories (there are two mega production sites of
Foxconn  Chengdu),  leaving  other  Taiwanese
manufacturing competitors such as Wistron and
Compal  far  behind (Global  Times  2012).  Local
education bureaus pitched in by compiling and
updating  lists  that  identify  vocational  schools
suitable  for  linking  to  Foxconn  internship
programs. All qualified schools were required to
participate in recruitment.
A government employment and social security office converted into a Foxconn recruitment station
at Hongguang Town, Pi County (in Chengdu City, Sichuan). Local states subsidize the growth of
private business with free hiring services and cheap labor supply.
To  assure  the  vocational  schools'  cooperation,
governments disburse funds to those that fulfill
company  targets  for  the  number  of  student
interns. If schools fail to meet human resources
requirements, education bureaus withhold funds
(Interview with a township government official
in Chengdu City,  17 December 2011).  Foxconn
has taken advantage of this system to extend its
labor recruitment networks to schools, where it
draws  on  the  assistance  of  local  officials  and
teachers to utilize student labor. Figure 3 shows
how  Foxconn  in  Sichuan  province  draws  up
plans  for  student  labor  recruitment,  then  top-
level  government  officials  lead  work  teams
across  different  administrative  levels  (city,
county,  district,  township and village)  to  meet
the deadlines and quotas, with the cooperation of
the vocational schools under their jurisdiction.
Foxconn internship recruitment through local mobilization, Sichuan. For illustrative purposes, we
simplify the complex, multi-level power relationships in the recruitment of student interns
through the triple alliance of Foxconn, local governments (from the provincial to the village level),
and vocational schools (under the jurisdiction of Sichuan province). The seven vocational schools
that we specify were publicly reported in local news and/or on school websites as participating in
the Foxconn internship programs. Source: Field data collected in Sichuan province.
All  production  workers,  including  student
interns,  at  Foxconn  Chengdu  are  engaged  in
making  iPads  exclusively  for  Apple.  Between
September  2011  and  January  2012  (a  school
semester), in Foxconn's Chengdu factories, more
than 7,000 students-approximately ten percent of
the  labor  force-were  working on the  assembly
line (Interviews with human resources managers
and  teachers  in  December  2011  and  January
2012). One of the participating schools, Pujiang
Vocational  School,  sent  162  students  on  22
September  2011  to  undertake  three-month
internships that were subjected to extension in
accordance  with  iPad  production  needs.  The
large Pengzhou Technical School signed up 309
students, accompanied by three male and three
female teachers during the entire internship. This
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is  typical  of  the  1:50  teacher-student  ratio
maintained  throughout  the  Foxconn  Chengdu
internship program in 2011-2012. Contrary to our
findings,  the  Apple-commissioned  factory
inspector  Fair  Labor  Association  "found  no
interns had been engaged at [Foxconn] Chengdu
since September 2011" (our emphasis) (Fair Labor
Association 2013, 5).7
A recruitment poster introducing the corporate background of Foxconn (Chengdu) is displayed
outside the Chengdu rail station, Sichuan. Since October 2010 Foxconn (Chengdu) has produced
iPads exclusively for Apple. In one semester during 2011-2012, it employed more than 7,000
"student interns" on the assembly line.
Government  officials  support  the  timely
fulfillment of labor recruitment assignments for
Foxconn  by  doing  public  relations  work  to
improve  the  company's  image.  The  targets
include  students  and  fresh  graduates.  A
township official-in-charge elaborated, "We were
tasked by upper level governments to eliminate
negative  social  attitudes  toward  Foxconn  after
the  [2010]  suicide  wave"8  (Interview  on  14
December 2011).  The main contents  of  student
labor  recruitment  are  Foxconn's  corporate
development,  its  economic  and  technological
strength,  and  its  expansion  prospects.  The
government team deploys messages "across the
internet,  radio,  television,  posters,  blogposts,
leaflets, telephone calls, door-to-door visits, and
the  mail  to  publicize  Foxconn's  culture,  and
guide recruitment targets in correct thinking and
understanding"  (The  People's  Government  of
Guangyuan  City  [Sichuan]  2011a).  Villages,
towns,  and  schools  are  saturated  with
propaganda to assure that Foxconn achieves the
status of a household name. The division of labor
is  summarized  as  follows  (Interview  with  a
township government official in Chengdu City,
16 December 2011):
1. The Human Resources and Social
Securi ty  Department  makes
recruitment  a  top  priority.
2.  The  Education  Department
a r r ange s  s choo l - bus ine s s
cooperation,  ensures  that  the
number  of  graduates  and  interns
meets  the  assigned  goal,  and
arranges for their transportation on
schedule  and  properly  supervised
by teachers.
3. The Finance Department ensures
that  recruitment  is  adequately
funded.
4.  The Public  Security  Department
comp le t e s  j ob  app l i c an t s '
background  investigations.
5.  The  Transportation  Department
assures  appropriate  transport
capacity  and  safety.
6. The Health Department provides
p re - emp loymen t  phys i c a l
examinations.
7.  Other  relevant  departments
ensure  that  recruitment  progresses
smoothly.
Foxconn  obtains  wealth  of  resources  from
multiple government departments to enhance its
cost-competitiveness and business capacity while
assuring  an  abundant  supply  of  workers  at  a
time of tightened labor markets. Indeed, in the
past 30-plus years, preferential treatment by local
governments has increased capital mobility and
facilitated  the  growth  of  transnational
corporations,  first  in  southeast  coastal  regions
and then in interior cities (McNally 2004; Leng
2005; Selden and Perry 2010). What is new is the
outreach  to  vocational  schools  to  tap  student
labor through a partnership of capital and state.
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One  municipal  government  actually  conducts
investigations  of  departments  that  "do  not
complete 50 percent of monthly tasks," pushing
for  a  100  percent  completion  rate  of  the
recruitment  quota  handed  down  by  Foxconn
(The  People's  Government  of  Guangyuan City
[Sichuan] 2011b).
"In  Chengdu,"  Andrew  Ross  (2006,  218)
concludes from his research on global IT service
outsourcing to China that "it was impossible not
to come across evidence of the state's hand in the
fostering of high-tech industry." From Sichuan to
central  China's  Henan  province,  provincial
governments have similarly channelled financial
and administrative resources to support Foxconn
hiring.  In  June  2010,  the  Zhengzhou  City
Education Bureau directed all vocational schools
under its jurisdiction to dispatch students 1,000
miles away to Foxconn's Shenzhen factories for
employment and/or internships.  This step was
taken  to  make  sure  students  would  complete
their training in time for the August opening of a
new  manufacturing  base  in  Zhengzhou,
provincial capital of Henan. Foxconn Zhengzhou
exclusively  assembles  iPhones  for  Apple.  The
opening passage of the government notification
to  all  education  units  reads  (Zhengzhou  City
Education Bureau (Henan) 2010):
To  promote  the  city's  vocational  education,
accelerate the pace of educational development,
deepen school-business  cooperation,  strengthen
customized  training,  and  promote  industry,  it
has  been  decided  to  launch  an  employment
(internship)  partnership  with  Foxconn
Technology  Group,  and  to  arrange  for  all
vocational  school  students  to  work  (intern)  at
Foxconn Shenzhen.
Specifics  of  the  sweeteners  offered to  Foxconn
include the following (Henan Provincial Poverty
Alleviation Office 2010.):
1. Implementing a policy of rewards
for job introductions at the standard
rate of 200 yuan per person from the
d e s i g n a t e d  g o v e r nm e n t
employment  fund.
2.  Giving  every  successful  worker
(or intern) a 600-yuan subsidy from
the  des ignated  government
employment  fund.
The  Henan  provincial  government,  using
taxpayers' money, pays for incentives to schools
or labor agencies ("the job introduction fee"  of
200 yuan/person) that arrange for employment
and/or internships at  Foxconn.  In August  and
September  2010,  local  government  officials
divided  the  20,000-recruit  goal  among  23
counties  and  cities  (each  new  worker/intern
receives 600 yuan). For the targeted recruitment
of 20,000 persons, the government bill would be
16,000,000 yuan (= 20,000 persons × (200 + 600)
yuan).  Each  city  or  county  government  was
assigned specific recruitment targets, with quotas
within each district subdivided down to villages
and towns.  Table 1 shows the number of new
Foxconn recruits that each of the 23 localities was
ordered to produce. From this moment, student
internships were transformed into a government-
organized  activity  in  the  service  of  a  private
employer (see also, Henan Provincial Education
Department 2010).
Gove rnmen t  R e c ru i tmen t
Assignments for Foxconn, Henan
 
Name Targets for
August 2010
(persons)
Targets for
September 2010
(persons)
Total (persons)
1 Xinyang 1,000 1,000 2,000
2 Zhoukou 940 940 1,880
3 Luoyang 850 900 1,750
4 Nanyang 850 850 1,700
5 Shangqiu 850 850 1,700
6 Zhumadian 850 850 1,700
7 Puyang 750 700 1,450
8 Xinxiang 680 680 1,360
9 Anyang 650 650 1,300
10 Pingdingshan 550 550 1,100
11 Kaifeng 500 500 1,000
12 Zhengzhou 200 200 400
13 Hebi 200 200 400
14 Jiaozuo 200 200 400
15 Xuchang 200 200 400
16 Luohe 200 200 400
17 Sanmenxia 200 200 400
18 Gushi County, Xinxiang 100 100 200
19 Jiyuan 50 50 100
20 Dengzhou City, Nanyang 50 50 100
21 Yongcheng City, Shangqiu 50 50 100
22 Xiangcheng City, Zhoukou 50 50 100
23 Gongyi City, Zhengzhou 30 30 60
 Total 10,000 10,000 20,000
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The  Henan  provincial  government
established  an  inter-departmental
committee  to  coordinate  labor
recruitment at Foxconn. The 20,000
new recruits included students and
non-student job seekers.
Source:  Henan  Provincial  Poverty
Alleviation Office 2010.
Student interns-cheap, youthful, and productive-
are a new source of labor that is growing larger
in  step  with  the  expansion  of  vocational
education.  Steven  McKay  in  Satanic  Mills  or
Silicon  Islands  concludes  that  high-tech
commodity producers "focus their labor concerns
on cost, availability, quality, and controllability"
to enhance profitability (2006, 42, italics original).
On 1 November 2011, Han Chinese and Tibetan
student interns got into a brawl during working
hours. The incident sounded an alarm and a vice
principal from one of the participating vocational
schools arrived on the scene the next day to "look
after his students," reported interviewee Teacher
Jiang. He added, "All of the few dozen students
were  laid  off.  Foxconn  demanded  that  the
schools  concerned  immediately  'take  back  the
bad students' to prevent any disruption to work"
(Interview on 15 December 2011). The assistance
of the vice principal in removing the interns to
whom  Foxconn  objected  reveals  other
dimensions of how the schools and the enterprise
cooperate  in  exercising  dual  control  over
students  (Smith  and  Chan  2015).  Psychosocial
behaviour, such as playing video games all night
and  not  going  to  work  on  time,  as  well  as
slowing down due to loss of motivation to work
hard,  however ,  cont inued.  Foxconn's
presentation  of  Outstanding  Student  Intern
Awards-also  known as  the  "hardworking  bee"
prize-failed to instill  stronger commitment and
loyalty  among  interns  who  perceived  the
internship  as  squandering  their  education  and
found the work demeaning.
None  of  the  38  interviewed  interns  expressed
interest in working for Foxconn after graduation.
If they were interested in assembly line jobs, they
would have started working straight away after
finishing  middle  school  rather  than  seeking
specialized training in multiple fields. "Come on,
what do you think we've learned standing for
more than ten hours a day manning the machines
on  the  line?  What's  an  internship?  There's  no
relation to what we study in school. Every day is
just a repetition of one or two simple motions,
like a robot," Lintong emphasized (Interview on
29 November 2011).
IV. Conclusion
If the Chinese government's goal is to encourage
workforce  preparedness  by  investing  in
vocational training, with student internships as a
core component, the policy is a failure. Foxconn
has shifted hiring costs onto local governments
and outsourced recruitment to vocational schools
to obtain a flexible, low-cost labor supply. In this
capital-state-school alliance, the incorporation of
students  into  the  workplace  in  the  guise  of
internships  has  served  the  interests  of  capital,
while generating intern protests over unfair and
illegal  treatment.9  Intense  competition  among
localities  to  lure  foreign  investment  has
undermined  enforcement  of  labor  and
educational  laws.  Notwithstanding  significant
Chinese legal  reforms to date,  there remains a
deep-seated  conflict  between  state  legitimation
and  local  accumulation,  with  the  result  that
student  workers'  rights  and  interests  are
sacrificed. Companies have continued to exploit
the  internal  contradictions  of  the  state  to
maximize their gains, and local states have bent
education  and  labor  rules  and  regulations  to
attract businesses. This is one important facet of
China's distinctive state capitalism.
Speaking  of  the  dynamism  of  state-society
relations,  Ching  Kwan  Lee  (2007,  17)  "sees
contradictions within different state imperatives
and insists that state power is not independent of
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but  rather  constituted  through  its  engagement
with  social  groups  in  their  acquiescence  and
activism, triggered by contradictory state goals
and policies." We observe that, under mounting
public  concerns  of  student  worker  abuses,
including  child  labor  hidden  in  the  guise  of
interns  at  Foxconn's  labor-hungry  factories
(SACOM 2012), the Chinese central government
has recently proposed new "Draft Rules on the
Management  of  Vocational  School  Student
Internships"  (Ministry  of  Education  of  the
People's Republic of China 2012). These rules, if
vigorously  implemented,  would  require  that
student internships have substantial educational
content and work-skill training plans, along with
comprehensive  labor  protections  for  teenage
workers.  As  of  December  2014,  however,  the
draft rules still had not been issued (Ministry of
Education  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China
2014), suggesting opposition from employers and
their allies.
At the industry level, in an attempt to polish its
corporate image,  Apple (2013,  19)  reiterated in
January 2013 its standards for suppliers' hiring of
students: "Student working hours must comply
with legal restrictions.... We've begun to partner
with industry consultants to help our suppliers
improve  their  policies,  procedures,  and
management  of  internship  programs  to  go
beyond  what  the  law  requires."  Claiming  to
exercise corporate social responsibility in global
supply-chain  management,  Apple  never
acknowledged its  own culpability  in  imposing
tight  delivery  schedules  and  high  quality
demands at the lowest possible prices (Chan et
a l .  2 013 ,  2 015 ;  Chakrabor t t y  2013 ) .
Manufacturers,  faced  with  buyers'  tight
deadlines and ruthless  demands,  in turn place
tremendous  pressure  on  frontline  workers
including  interns  to  retain  contracts  and  stay
profitable.  In  February  2014,  Scott  Rozelle,  co-
director of the Rural Education Action Program
at Stanford University, announced a monitoring
and evaluation program of student internships at
the invitation of Apple in Apple's China-based
major  suppliers  (Rural  Education  Action
Program 2014). As of our writing in August 2015,
the findings were still not publicly available.
Ross  Perlin  in  his  book  on  American  and
European  internship  practices,  Intern  Nation,
comments,  "The  very  significance  of  the  word
intern  lies  in  its  ambiguity"  (2011,  23,  italics
original). In the four years we have been working
on  this  research,  we  have  seen  that  the
recruitment of interns as cheap and disposable
labor at Foxconn has become routine practice that
continues  in  the  present  day,  and  extends  to
many  other  companies  such  as  Samsung  and
Lenovo (see also China Labor Watch 2014; Dou
2014).  Schools,  facing  financial  and  political
pressure,  are  unable  to  shield  students  from
internships that violate the letter and spirit of the
law.  Business-friendly local  authorities  sponsor
such  internship  programs  through  direct
subsidies  and  administrative  support  to  large
corporations. In China, the student labor regime
has  become  in tegra l  t o  i t s  e conomic
development,  frequently  at  the  sacrifice  of  all
workers' interests.
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Notes
1 Concerning the rights protection of China-based
student interns in transnational production, on 16
December 2013, we wrote letters to, respectively,
Foxconn CEO Terry Gou and Apple CEO Tim
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Cook.  Apple  is  the  world's  most  profitable
technology company, which contracts Foxconn,
among  others,  to  manufacture  its  branded
products.  The  two  letters,  and  company
statements,  are  on  file  with  the  authors.
2  On  the  inherent  contradictions  between
legitimacy and profitability in global capitalism,
and the varied responses of industrial capital and
the state under specific historical context, see also
Burawoy (1985), Silver (2003), and Webster et al.
(2008).
3  The  names  of  our  interviewees,  unless
otherwise specified, are changed to protect them.
4 Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Protection  of  Minors  (Zhonghua  Renmin
Gongheguo Wei Chengnianren Baohu Fa  2013)
protects  young  people  under  18  for  their
balanced  development  and  healthy  growth.
Article  20  stipulates  that  schools,  including
vocational  schools,  shall  "cooperate  with  the
parents or other guardians of the minor students
to  guarantee  the  minor  students  time  for
sleeping,  recreational  activities  and  physical
exercises and may not increase their burden of
study."
5  As  of  December  2013,  in  Shenzhen,  Foxconn
paid  ten  percent  of  employees'  basic  monthly
wage for  social  insurance  (180  yuan)  and five
percent  for  the  mandatory  housing  provident
fund (90 yuan), that is, 270 yuan/month in total.
6  T h e  S o n g  o f  t h e  V o l g a  B o a tm e n
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlABtBm6
V5o) (in Russian with Chinese illustration)
7 The Fair Labor Association (FLA) received from
Apple  membership  dues  of  US$250,000,  plus
audit  fees  for  conducting  its  investigation  at
Foxconn  Chengdu  and  two  other  Foxconn
factories  in  Shenzhen  (Longhua  and  Guanlan)
between 2011 and 2012 (Weir 2012).  Given the
complete financial dependence of the FLA on the
companies that support it, we question its ability
to fulfill its purported mission to protect workers
in the global economy.
8 In 2010, at least 18 workers attempted suicide at
Foxconn's facilities in Shenzhen and other cities,
resulting in 14 deaths and four crippling injuries,
see Chan and Pun (2010) and Chan (2013).
9  I t  wa s  e s t ima t ed  t h a t  i n  May  2 0 10
approximately 70 percent  of  the 1,800 workers
were  student  interns  at  a  Honda  parts  plant
based  in  Nanhai  District  in  Foshan  City,
Guangdong.  Following  a  significant  victory  in
which Honda workers received an additional 500
yuan per month and underpaid interns over 600
yuan more per month, auto workers at supplier
factories  of  Toyota  and  Hyundai  were
emboldened to take their demands to managers
(see Butollo and ten Brink 2012; Chan and Hui
2014; Friedman 2014, chap. 5; Lyddon et al. 2015).
